UC Irvine Law Review
Volume 4
Issue 1 “Law As . . .” II, History As Interface for the
Interdisciplinary Study of Law

Article 14

3-2014

Humane Killing and the Ethics of the Secular:
Regulating the Death Penalty, Euthanasia, and
Animal Slaughter
Shai J. Lavi
Tel Aviv University

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uci.edu/ucilr
Part of the Law and Philosophy Commons, and the Law Enforcement and Corrections
Commons
Recommended Citation
Shai J. Lavi, Humane Killing and the Ethics of the Secular: Regulating the Death Penalty, Euthanasia, and Animal Slaughter, 4 U.C. Irvine
L. Rev. 297 (2014).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.uci.edu/ucilr/vol4/iss1/14

This Article and Essay is brought to you for free and open access by UCI Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in UC Irvine Law
Review by an authorized editor of UCI Law Scholarly Commons.

Humane Killing and the Ethics of the
Secular: Regulating the Death Penalty,
Euthanasia, and Animal Slaughter
Shai J. Lavi*
Introduction: Death and the Ethics of the Secular ................................................... 297
I. Baze v. Rees: Convergence and Cross-Reference .................................................. 300
II. Three Beginnings ....................................................................................................... 303
A. Separating Pain from Death .................................................................... 308
B. Intolerable Pain .......................................................................................... 310
C. Dying and the Phantom of Pain ............................................................. 311
III. Humane Killing Beyond the Disenchantment/Enchantment Divide .......... 314
A. Secularization and Disenchantment ....................................................... 314
B. Enchantment and the Sacred .................................................................. 316
C. Toward an Anthropology of the Secular ............................................... 319
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 323

INTRODUCTION: DEATH AND THE ETHICS OF THE SECULAR
In the short story “Three Deaths,” Tolstoy plots the passing away of three
unlikely protagonists—a noblewoman, a coachman, and a tree.1 Though the
deaths unfold within shared coordinates of time and space—Russia in the second
half of the nineteenth century2—they manifest radically different attunements to
* Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, Tel Aviv University. The author would like to thank Leora
Bilsky, Yishai Blank, Marianne Constable, Khaled Furani, Roy Kreitner, Menny Mautner, Issi RosenZvi, and Yofi Tirosh, as well as participants in the “Law As . . .” conference at the University of
California, Irvine School of Law and participants in the “Law and Political Thought” and “Law and
Philosophy” workshops both at Tel Aviv University for their helpful comments and suggestions. The
author is grateful to Joel Fox and Dvir Yogev for their excellent research assistance. This Essay has
been made possible with the help of a research grant from the Minerva Center for the
Interdisciplinary Study of the End of Life at Tel Aviv University.
1. LEO TOLSTOY, Three Deaths, in TOLSTOY’S SHORT FICTION: REVISED TR ANSLATIONS,
BACKGROUNDS AND SOURCES CRITICISM 45 (Michael R. Katz ed., 2d ed. 2008) [hereinafter
TOLSTOY, Three Deaths]. Tolstoy was preoccupied with death and dying in his work, most famously in
L EO TOLSTOY, THE DEATH OF IVAN ILYICH AND THE DEVIL (Hugh Aplin trans., Hesperus Press
Ltd. 2005) (1887 & 1890) [hereinafter TOLSTOY, IVAN ILYICH].
2. TOLSTOY, Three Deaths, supra note 1, at 45 n.† (first published in 1859).
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mortality. The noblewoman, who suffers from consumption, refuses to face the
reality of her impending death, clinging to the hope that a trip to Italy will help her
regain her fast failing health.3 The old peasant driver, who lies sick and agonizing
on an oven in the carriage drivers’ quarters, is well aware of his approaching
demise but makes little of his condition and accepts death as a matter of fact.4
Finally, the tall young tree in the middle of the forest, oblivious of its own
finitude, finds its death early one morning when a few powerful chops from the
woodcutter bring it crashing down.5
Taking as my point of departure the 2008 death-penalty case of Baze v. Rees,6
but then stepping back into the nineteenth century in search for a deeper
understanding, the following Article narrates three more deaths of the period, with
protagonists just as improbable. Unlike Tolstoy, however, my aim is to explore the
ways in which very different modes of dying began to converge in the nineteenth
century, under the pressure of cultural sensitivities and legal sensibilities, and today
bear a striking resemblance. All three deaths, or more accurately takings of life, are
sanctioned by the state and fashioned by law, and all three have stirred significant
legal controversy and brought about legal reform. Their protagonists are the death
row inmate, the terminally ill patient, and the farm animal. Their killings take the
familiar forms of the death penalty, euthanasia, and animal slaughter.
These deaths, which are seemingly unconnected, have given rise to strikingly
similar political concerns and legal regulations. What exactly then ties together the
death penalty in a Kentucky penitentiary, mercy killing by a Dutch physician, and
the deadly blow from a bolt in abattoirs across the country? How has it come
about that the ethics and practice of these methods of killing share so much in
common, as we shall see, whereas the justifications for the killings themselves
share nothing at all? Indeed, they seem as incommensurable as the political
alignments they form, which often pit reds, blues, and greens against each other.
The riddle I wish to present, and the puzzle I will only begin to resolve, concerns
the convergence of these modes of killing and emergence of uniform laws and
techniques of our death-polity.
If these practices of taking life nevertheless converge, their meeting ground
is on a deeper ethical, cultural, and ontological plane. They mark the simultaneous
decline of an older ethics of death and the emergence of a new one. The
traditional ways of taking life and different forms of suffering that accompanied
them have become intolerable: the merciless execution of the subject by the
sovereign at the scaffold, the excruciating pain often accompanying the departure
of the soul at the deathbed, and the ruthless dominion of humans over animal life
and death. With the advancement of a modern ethics codified into law, new

3.
4.
5.
6.

Id. at 47–49.
Id. at 50–51.
Id. at 56.
Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008) (plurality opinion).

2014] HUMANE KILLING AND THE ETHICS OF THE SECULAR

299

methods of killing have replaced older ones.7 These three deaths, each of which
traditionally had their distinct justifications, belonging to a different realm of
reality—namely, the relationships between Man and God, Man and Man, and Man
and animal—have undergone a similar transformation which has brought them
closer to each other since the late nineteenth century.
Most strikingly, the emerging ethics clearly separates the question of killing
from the method of killing. Whereas the former is taken for granted (in the case of
animals), is constitutionally permissible (as in the case of the death penalty),8 or in
any event is no longer taken as a legal taboo (as in the case of physician-assisted
suicide),9 the latter is placed under close scrutiny and monitored for any
unnecessary imposition of pain and suffering on the helpless body.
An overly hasty critique may seek to expose the ideal of humane killing as a
hypocritical oxymoron. How can the law be so carefully attuned to the suffering
of death row inmates, while remaining indifferent to their execution? Is the
growing support for the legalization of euthanasia no more than a thin veil
intended to conceal the cruelty of death from the bystander and perpetrator more
than from the dying patient herself? And how can the law tolerate the killing of
masses of animals for human consumption, but categorically oppose traditional
methods of slaughter as inhumane?
Rejecting the accusation of hypocrisy, but without adopting the selfrighteous justifications that dominate the legal canon, the following Article seeks
to reexamine the emergence of a new regulation of death and dying and ultimately
the advancement of a new ethics, which reaches far beyond the ambit of the
deathbed. Indeed, humane killing is no oxymoron, and far from being a logical
contradiction, it captures a deep and meaningful logic of modern law and ethics.
Building on the work of anthropologist Talal Asad, I will refer to this ethics as
“the ethics of the secular.”10 Ethics here does not signify a given set of norms and
beliefs (as in “secular ethics”) but rather the broader cultural or, better,
cosmological framework in which such norms are formed. Humane killing offers
an opportunity to closely explore the emergence of this new ethics and the specific
sense in which its understanding as “secular,” and its relationship to religion and
more precisely to the “sacred,” sheds light on this distinct set of practices and
sensitivities that dominate the current legal mindset.
At the heart of this new ethics is a particular concern with pain and suffering.
7. See generally David Garland, Modes of Capital Punishment: The Death Penalty in Historical
Perspective, in A MERICA’S DEATH PENALTY: BETWEEN PAST AND PRESENT 30, 53–54 (David
Garland et al. eds., 2011) (comparing medieval and modern modes of employing the death penalty).
8. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976).
9. See The Oregon Death with Dignity Act, OR. R EV. STAT. §§ 127.800–.995 (West 2003 &
Supp. 2014); The Washington Death with Dignity Act, WASH. R EV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.245.010–.904
(West 2011); Baxter v. State, 224 P.3d 1211, 1221 (Mont. 2009) (finding that physicians may employ
consent as a defense).
10. See generally TALAL ASAD, FORMATIONS OF THE SECULAR: CHRISTIANITY, ISLAM,
MODERNITY 16 (2003).
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It will not suffice to take this concern at face value and as a benign application of
the Benthamite imperative to minimize pain;11 rather, what is called for is a close
scrutiny of this ethics, which singles out certain forms of suffering while ignoring
others.12 What is interesting in the development of the ethics of the secular is, as
Asad writes, “not merely that some forms of suffering were to be taken more
seriously than others, but that ‘inhuman’ suffering as opposed to ‘necessary’ or
‘inevitable’ suffering was regarded as being essentially gratuitous, and therefore
legally punishable.”13
The case of humane killing offers an especially apt opportunity to analyze
what makes certain forms of suffering rather than others intolerable. While Asad
is correct in pointing out that only unnecessary pain becomes intolerable,14 what
precisely makes certain ways of suffering inevitable and others gratuitous remains
an open question. This has less to do with medical developments and much more
with the rise of a new secular ethics and cosmology that has made the pangs of
death “unnecessary.” As we shall see, this secular ethics of death, pain, and dying
emerged no later than the second half of the nineteenth century and continues to
govern the most recent legal developments.
In the final analysis, the aim of this Article is to understand humane killing
by contemplating its fundamentally secular nature, and conversely to deepen our
understanding of our secular age through a critical examination of humane killing.
The critique questions the way champions of this emerging ethics portray their
position as enlightened secular moral progress, without arriving at the opposite
conclusion, which reduces secular ethics to the dynamics of power relations and
wanton violence.
I. BAZE V. R EES: CONVERGENCE AND CROSS-R EFERENCE
In Baze v. Rees,15 the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of the
lethal injection under the Eighth Amendment.16 Though the case concerned the
legitimacy of lethal injection as a method of punishment, the Court soon found
itself discussing other contexts of taking life. At the heart of the case was the
three-dose protocol used by the state of Kentucky as well as by thirty-five other
states and the federal government.17 Of the three stages—anesthetizing,

11. JEREMY BENTHAM, A N INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION 2 (Laurence J. LaFleur ed., Hafner Publ’g Co. 1948) (1789).
12. ASAD, supra note 10, at 113.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 41 (2008) (plurality opinion).
16. For a discussion of the case and its history in a somewhat different context, see Ty Alper,
Anesthetizing the Public Conscience: Lethal Injection and Animal Euthanasia, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 817,
818–44 (2008); Jeff Welty, Different Endings: Lethal Injection, Animal Euthanasia, Humane Slaughter, and
Unregulated Slaughter, 3 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 61, 64–77 (2009).
17. Baze, 553 U.S. at 44.
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paralyzing, and killing by causing cardiac arrest18—the most questionable was the
second stage, inducing paralysis.19 Attorney for the petitioners, two death row
inmates, argued that if the first drug, the anesthetic sodium thiopental, is not
properly administered then the inability to detect this failure due to paralysis
induced by the second drug, pancuronium bromide, could lead to a tormented
death.20 Such a protocol, which might render the convict immobile while still
conscious and suffering, is cruel and unusual.21
The Court affirmed the constitutionality of the three-stage method by a vote
of seven to two, with Justices Ginsburg and Souter dissenting.22 Upholding the
constitutionality of the lethal injection procedure, the Court stated that petitioners
had failed to prove that the procedure caused a “substantial risk of serious harm”
and that merely proving that it caused an unnecessary risk did not meet this
constitutional standard.23 Furthermore, the majority opinion, written by Chief
Justice Roberts, held that it was difficult to regard the protocol as “objectively
intolerable” given the large number of states that have adopted the practice as
humane.24
Though often neglected in the legal literature, one of the powerful
arguments, rhetorically if not substantively, was the comparison the petitioners
drew between the death penalty and the killing of animals.25 To drive home their
point that the use of the three-dose method is cruel and unusual, petitioners called
attention to the fact that a similar method has been outlawed in the putting down
of animals.26 Indeed, laws regulating the euthanasia of pet animals in twenty-three
states, including Kentucky, outlaw the use of neuromuscular paralytics, precisely
because they may hide the fact that the animal was not properly anesthetized and
is suffering.27 Surely, petitioners argued, drugs that have been deemed inhumane
18. Id.
The first drug, sodium thiopental . . . is a fast-acting barbiturate sedative that induces a
deep, coma-like unconsciousness . . . . The second drug, pancuronium bromide . . . is a
paralytic agent that inhibits all muscular-skeletal movements . . . . Potassium chloride, the
third drug, interferes with the electrical signals that stimulate the contractions of the heart,
inducing cardiac arrest.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
19. See id. at 71–73 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Use of pancuronium bromide is particularly disturbing because—as the trial court
specifically found in this case—it serves “no therapeutic purpose.” The drug’s primary use
is to prevent involuntary muscle movements, and its secondary use is to stop respiration.
In my view, neither of these purposes is sufficient to justify the risk inherent in the use of
the drug.
Id. at 73 (Stevens, J., concurring).
20. Id. at 49 (plurality opinion).
21. Id. at 41.
22. Id. at 63.
23. Id. at 51.
24. Id. at 53.
25. See id. at 58.
26. Id.
27. Brief of Dr. Kevin Concannon et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Baze v.
Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008) (No. 07-5439), 2007 WL 3440946, at *18 & n.5.
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and illegal when administered to animals must be considered inhumane if
administered to humans.28 In the words of Justice Stevens, “It is unseemly—to say
the least—that Kentucky may well kill petitioners using a drug that it would not
permit to be used on their pets.”29
Repudiating this line of argument, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito
referred to yet another very different context of taking life—the Dutch practice of
euthanasia, which uses a similar three-dose protocol.30 Their ruling emphasized
that the Royal Dutch Society for the Advancement of Pharmacy recommends, in
fact, the use of the paralytic to bring about euthanasia.31 Furthermore, the Court
added that “other methods approved by veterinarians—such as stunning the
animal or severing its spinal cord—make clear that veterinary practice for animals
is not an appropriate guide to humane practices for humans.”32 Finally, the Court
concluded that the use of pancuronium bromide is not superfluous because in
addition to hastening death, its goal is “preserving the dignity of the procedure,
especially where convulsions or seizures could be misperceived as signs of
consciousness or distress.”33
Strongly objecting to the latter argument, Justice Stevens dissented:
Whatever minimal interest there may be in ensuring that a condemned
inmate dies a dignified death, and that witnesses to the execution are not
made uncomfortable by an incorrect belief (which could easily be
corrected) that the inmate is in pain, is vastly outweighed by the risk that
the inmate is actually experiencing excruciating pain that no one can
detect.34
Distinguishing the Dutch uses of paralytics in euthanasia protocols, Stevens points
out that whereas in the Netherlands physicians supervise medical euthanasia, no
such supervision is available in executions due to the ethical prohibition that bans
physicians and nurses from participating in the administration of the death
penalty.35
Strikingly, the Court’s close examination of the constitutionality of the death
penalty has prompted it to consider the use of similar methods in very different
contexts of legally-sanctioned killing.36 Beyond the immediate doctrinal analysis,
the case brings to the foreground the striking convergence in the execution of
patently different killings and, more importantly, a convergence in their underlying

28. Baze, 553 U.S. at 58.
29. Id. at 72–73 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also Workman v. Bredesen, 486 F. 3d 896, 926
(6th Cir. 2007) (Cole, J., dissenting) (“Tennessee protects dogs and cats from the risk of excruciating
pain in execution, but not death-row inmates.”).
30. Baze, 553 U.S. at 58; id. at 69 (Alito, J., concurring).
31. Id. at 58 (plurality opinion); id. at 69 (Alito, J., concurring).
32. Id. at 58 (plurality opinion).
33. Id. at 57.
34. Id. at 73 (Stevens, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
35. Id. at 77 n.9.
36. See id. at 58 (plurality opinion).
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ethical and epistemological foundations. To be sure, the Justices varied in the way
they employed the analogies between executing inmates, euthanizing the
terminally ill, and killing animals. Whereas the majority affirmed the comparison
between Dutch euthanasia and American execution,37 Justice Stevens drew
attention to the treatment of animals in comparison to humans.38 And yet, neither
ignored the emergence of striking affinities between these very different contexts
of taking life.
What sense can we make of this convergence? How deep does its logic go?
Is it merely a trivial outcome of the choice of optimal means to achieve a desired
end, or does it reach deeper into the foundations of our contemporary
jurisprudence of death and dying? The following questions will guide our historical
inquiry into these three deaths: First, since when has it become possible to
consider the death penalty, euthanasia for the terminally ill, and animal killing
within the same ethical and legal grid and to apply similar modes of execution to
these radically different bodies? Second, how has it come about that in all three
cases our laws and ethics separate the question of the legitimacy of killing from the
legitimacy of methods of killing, shifting their focus from the former to the latter?
What are the historical roots and cultural significance of other seemingly specific
aspects of Baze v. Rees—such as the tension between the experience and the
appearance of the body in pain?39 And, finally, what are the broader stakes in the
ethical and epistemological matrix of humane killing that emerged, as we shall see,
in the latter part of the nineteenth century and continues to govern the field of
lawful killings today?
II. THREE BEGINNINGS
In 1881, Dr. Alfred Southwick came across the marvels of electricity when
he saw an elderly drunkard touch the terminals of a live electrical generator.40 The
ease of death by electricity prompted the dentist and steamboat engineer to
propose a new way of executing the death penalty.41 He succeeded in convincing
the governor of the state of New York that the science of the present day might
supplant the cruel method of hanging with a more humane method.42 In 1886, the
New York state legislature resolved to appoint a commission to investigate and
report to the legislature “the most humane and practical method of carrying into
effect the sentence of death in capital cases.”43 The new method favored by the
37. Id.
38. Id. at 72 (Stevens, J., concurring).
39. Id. (plurality opinion).
40. Dawn Macready, Student Article, The “Shocking” Truth About the Electric Chair: An Analysis
of the Unconstitutionality of Electrocution, 26 OHIO N.U. L. R EV. 781, 783 (2000).
41. See Arden G. Christen & Joan A. Christen, Alfred P. Southwick, MDS, DDS: Dental
Practitioner, Educator and Originator of Electrical Executions, 48 J. H IST. DENTISTRY 117, 117 (2000).
42. See id.
43. Glass v. Louisiana, 471 U.S. 1080, 1082 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (internal citations
omitted).
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commission survived a century of medical and technological developments until it
too was deemed inhumane and was gradually replaced in recent decades by the
lethal injection as the preferred, and in some states exclusive, method of
execution.44
Admittedly, efforts to reform the death penalty had begun long before the
invention of the electric chair.45 By the late eighteenth century, it was already clear
that the infliction of pain was no longer the aim of the death penalty but only its
necessary outcome.46 Over the course of the nineteenth century hanging, too,
went through a series of reforms. Different methods were explored to make
hanging more expedient and less painful—including the introduction of a jerk-up
mechanism in place of the fall-down, experimentation with longer drops, and the
use of new triggers, including allowing the inmate to pull the lever himself.47 And
yet, as Banner notes:
Before the last third of the nineteenth century, accounts of bungled or
obviously painful executions contain no indication that the spectators
found them too troubling to bear. But that began to change. . . . There
was nothing new about painful hangings; what was new was the shock
that they produced in spectators.48
Dr. Southwick’s reform opened the door for the pursuit of ever more
humane methods of killing and a continuous questioning of the legitimacy of
existing modes of taking life.49 Ordinarily, new methods of killing came to replace
older ones as a consequence of technical developments and growing objection
among the public to existing methods.50 Occasionally, as in the case of Baze v.
Rees,51 the legitimacy of a method made it to the courts. Three legal precedents are
recorded in American history: an 1879 case concerning the firing squad,52 an 1890
case concerning electrocution,53 and a 1947 case of re-electrocution after the first
attempt was botched.54 In all three cases, the Court examined the legitimacy of the
chosen method of execution, but did not question the legitimacy of execution

44. Richard C. Dieter, Methods of Execution and Their Effect on the Use of the Death Penalty in the
United States, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 789, 798 (2008).
45. See, e.g., CESARE BECCARIA, A N ESSAY ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 102–17
(Voltaire trans., London, Printed for F. Newbery, 4th ed. 1775) (condemning the usage of the death
penalty as more excessive than what is needed to deter).
46. STUART BANNER, T HE DEATH PENALTY: A N A MERICAN H ISTORY 170–77 (2002).
47. Id. at 173.
48. Id. at 172–74.
49. See Christen & Christen, supra note 41, at 117.
50. ROBERT JOHNSON, DEATH WORK: A STUDY OF THE MODERN EXECUTION PROCESS
40 (2d ed. 1998).
51. Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 41 (2008) (plurality opinion).
52. Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878).
53. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890).
54. Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947) (plurality opinion).
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itself. Ultimately, the Court found these methods constitutional,55 but only
because they conformed with prevailing norms of decency.56
Chairing the New York Commission on Capital Punishment was Elbridge T.
Gerry, a prominent attorney and counsel for the Society for the Prevention of
Cruelty to Animals.57 The appointment of an animal protection activist to the
committee was anything but surprising. At the turn of the twentieth century there
was a close connection between the humane treatment of animals and of death
row inmates, and activists of one cause would often be committed to the other. In
1891, Henry Salt, to take another example, founded the Humanitarian League,
which opposed not only corporal and capital punishment but also inhumane
methods of animal slaughter.58 What animal protection activists and penal
reformers shared in common was much more than a general sentiment of
humaneness. It was a specific ethical concern with the methods of humane killing.
Admittedly, the first laws regulating animal protection were enacted already
in the 1820s, but the major breakthrough took place in the 1860s with the
establishment of the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals
(ASPCA), which was founded in 1866.59 Two main issues were on the Society’s
agenda during the late nineteenth century and have been ever since—animal
experimentation (vivisection) and the meat industry.60 The latter concern played a
major role in the slaughterhouse reform that took place in the second half of the
nineteenth century.
In the early nineteenth century it was not self-evident that
slaughterhouses, often located in residential areas, so that slaughtering
could be done “at home,” were a nuisance, but by mid-century this was
changing. A growing desire for hygienic, non-violent (that is, humane),
and undetectable slaughter . . . . The slaughtering that had, up until 1869,
taken place “out in the open within the sight of the public including
children,” was no longer to be witnessed . . . .61
Regulation of the slaughterhouse included the introduction of new and more
humane methods of slaughter. Animal activists called upon butchers and

55. Francis, 329 U.S. at 463; Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 449; Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 135–36.
56. BANNER, supra note 46, at 40–43, 176–77; see also Kristopher A. Haines, Lethally Injected:
Devolving Standards of Decency in American Society, 34 CAP. U. L. R EV. 459, 461 (2005).
57. N.E. Brill, Humanity in the Death Sentence, 10 J. A M. M ED. ASS’N 114, 114 (1888).
58. Ian MacLachlan, Humanitarian Reform, Slaughter Technology, and Butcher Resistance in NineteenthCentury Britain, in M EAT, MODERNITY, AND THE R ISE OF THE MODERN SLAUGHTERHOUSE 107,
110 (Paula Young Lee ed., 2008).
59. David Favre & Vivien Tsang, The Development of Anti-Cruelty Laws During the 1800s, 1993
DETROIT C. L. R EV. 1, 13 (1993). Interestingly, there is even one reported law dating back to
seventeenth-century Puritans, but that was an exception. See Susan L. Goodkin, The Evolution of Animal
Rights, 18 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. R EV. 259, 261 (1987).
60. See Favre & Tsang, supra note 59, at 14–18.
61. Lindgren Johnson, To “Admit All Cattle Without Distinction”: Reconstructing Slaughter in the
Slaughterhouse Cases and the New Orleans Crescent City Slaughterhouse, in M EAT, MODERNITY, AND THE
R ISE OF THE SLAUGHTERHOUSE, supra note 58, at 198, 200, 206–07.
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legislators to reexamine and improve existing methods.62 Specifically, they
deplored the traditional method of neck cut by a sharp knife as unnecessarily
painful and of axing as inhumane.63 Animal protection societies—in the United
States, England, and Continental Europe—insisted that animals be stunned prior
to their slaughter claiming that “our solemn moral and humanitarian duty
commands that such killing be done as quickly and painlessly as possible.”64
Preslaughter stunning of livestock became a routine practice during the first
few decades of the twentieth century in the United States.65 Different methods of
stunning were introduced including the use of a heavy bolt, electrocution, and
gas.66 The new techniques spread across Europe and the United States, being
enforced at first by local regulations,67 then gradually by national legislation in
places like Switzerland (1893),68 Britain (1933),69 and Germany (1933).70 By 1958
the U.S. Congress had also codified the stunning requirement in the Humane
Methods of Slaughter Act (HMSA).71
The improvement of slaughter methods is continuously sought by animal
protection societies and veterinarians. One of the unremitting points of public and
legal contention concerns the ritual slaughter of animals by Jews and Muslims,
whose laws prohibit the stunning of cattle prior to slaughter.72 Jewish and Muslim
slaughter has been prohibited in Switzerland and Scandinavia since the late
nineteenth to early twentieth century73 and continues to be debated across Europe
and in the United States today.74
The legal regulation of animal euthanasia entered public discussion and
regulation only in recent decades.75 However, the regulation of euthanasia and the
62. There are several studies of this history. See, e.g., Dorothee Brantz, Stunning Bodies: Animal
Slaughter, Judaism, and the Meaning of Humanity in Imperial Germany, 35 CENT. EUR. H IST. 167 (2002);
Robin Judd, The Politics of Beef: Animal Advocacy and the Kosher Butchering Debates in Germany, 10 JEWISH
SOC. STUD. 117 (2003); see also Shai Lavi, Animal Laws and the Politics of Life: Slaughterhouse Regulation in
Germany, 1870–1917, 8 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 221, 226 (2006) [hereinafter Lavi, Animal Laws];
Shai Lavi, Unequal Rites: Jews, Muslims and the History of Ritual Slaughter in Germany, 37 TEL AVIVER
JAHRBUCH FÜR DEUTSCHE GESCHICHTE 164, 164–84 (2009).
63. MacLachlan, supra note 58, at 112.
64. NORTH GERMAN CONFEDERATION R EICHSTAG, STENOGRAPHISCHE BERICHTE ÜBER
DIE VERHANDLUNGEN DES R EICHSTAGES DES NORDDEUTSCHEN BUNDES, 815 (1887) (Ger.).
65. The slaughter reform of the late nineteenth century is familiar to American constitutional
scholars from the famous “Slaughter-House Cases.” Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872).
66. MacLachlan, supra note 58, at 117.
67. See, for example, discussion of the German case in Brantz, supra note 62 at 187–88.
68. See Pablo Lerner & Alfredo Mordechai Rabello, The Prohibition of Ritual Slaughtering (Kosher
Shechita and Halal) and Freedom of Religion of Minorities, 22 J. L. & R ELIGION 1, 14–15 (2006).
69. MacLachlan, supra note 58, at 126.
70. Lavi, Animal Laws, supra note 62, at 227.
71. Constantinos Hotis, The Anthropological Machine at the Abattoir: The Humane Methods of
Slaughter Act, 2006 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 503, 503.
72. Jeff Welty, Humane Slaughter Laws, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 175, 177–78 (2007).
73. Brantz, supra note 62, at 168 n.3, 192.
74. See R ICHARD POTZ ET AL., SCHÄCHTEN: R ELIGIONSFREIHEIT UND TIERSCHUTZ (2001)
(Ger.).
75. Larry Carbone, Euthanasia, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA FOR A NIMAL RIGHTS AND A NIMAL
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treatment of the dying patient, as we shall now see, date back to the late
nineteenth century and conform to a similar logic of guaranteeing an ever more
humane experience of dying.76
Several years before Dr. Southwick led his campaign to reform the method
of execution, Samuel D. Williams, an otherwise unknown English businessman,
published the first modern proposal for medical euthanasia.77 Impressed by the
recent discovery of chloroform and its use during surgery, the author proposed a
solution to the problem of dying patients suffering from unbearable pain.78 He
wrote:
[I]n all cases of hopeless and painful illness, it should be the recognized
duty of the medical attendant, whenever so desired by the patient, to
administer chloroform, or such other anaesethetic as may bye-and-bye
supersede chloroform—so as to destroy consciousness at once and put
the sufferer to a quick and painless death. . . .79
Williams was the first to advocate the medical hastening of death as a public
policy in the Anglo-American world.80 At the time, euthanasia was fiercely
opposed by both the medical establishment and the general public, and only a few
leading American physicians were willing to openly endorse Williams’ proposal.81
By 1906, legislators in Ohio and Iowa were already drafting early bills legalizing
euthanasia.82 Although these attempts were soon defeated,83 they marked a
demand for a new way of dying that would persist into the twenty-first century.
Williams foresaw that his initial proposal of chloroform would be gradually
adjusted to meet developments in the administration of death.84 Indeed, today in
the states of Oregon, Washington, and Montana physicians can legally prescribe a
drinkable solution of barbital for hasting death,85 and in the Netherlands,
hopelessly suffering patients have the right to a lethal injection.86 While the United
WELFARE 224, 225 (Mark Beckoff ed., 2d ed. 2010) (“The American Veterinary Medical Association
first published guidelines for animal euthanasia in 1963 and has updated them six times, most recently
in 2007.”).
76. For detailed studies of the history of euthanasia, see IAN DOWBIGGIN, A M ERCIFUL
E ND: THE EUTHANASIA MOVEMENT IN MODERN A MERICA (2003); N.D.A. K EMP, ‘M ERCIFUL
R ELEASE’: THE HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EUTHANASIA MOVEMENT (2002); SHAI LAVI, THE
MODERN ART OF DYING: A HISTORY OF EUTHANASIA IN THE UNITED STATES (2005).
77. See Charles B. Williams, Euthanasia, 70 M ED. & SURGICAL R EP. 909 (1894).
78. Id. at 911.
79. Id.
80. L AVI, supra note 76, at 41.
81. Id. at 42.
82. Jacob M. Appel, A Duty to Kill? A Duty to Die? Rethinking the Euthanasia Controversy of 1906,
78 BULL. H IST. M ED. 610, 610 (2004).
83. The Right to Die, 2 BRIT. M ED. J. 1215, 1216 (1911).
84. Williams, supra note 77, at 911.
85. Oregon and Washington have passed a “Death with Dignity Act” whereas the
decriminalization of physician-assisted suicide in Montana is based on a court decision. See Nickolas
C. Murnion & Rita L. Marker, Brief Amicus Curiae in Robert Baxter versus State of Montana, 25 ISSUES
L. & M ED. 33, 33–34 (2009).
86. Jackson Pickett, Can Legalization Improve End-of-Life Care? An Empirical Analysis of the Results
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States Supreme Court has refused to recognize a constitutional right to physicianassisted suicide,87 the struggle of dying patients to be allowed a more humane
death continues, and the legal debate concerning the right to a painless death is far
from being resolved.88
What all three cases share most prominently is the anxiety associated with a
painful death. A new sensitivity to the pain that accompanies dying, which
developed no later than the early 1800s, was gradually translated into social
reform. The question facing policymakers, legislators, and courts was not simply
whether a specific form of killing was intentionally cruel, but concerned the
infliction of unnecessary pain—is the current way of dying acceptable, once
another way of ending life has been made available? Can hanging be tolerated,
once the electric chair has been conceived? Is a painful death constitutional, once
anesthesia has been discovered? Should animals continue to suffer unnecessary
pain, if they can be electrically stunned or, even more simply, shot in the head?
But beneath this benign notion of humanism and a utilitarian calculus of
minimizing pain lies a deeper transformation in the understanding of the
relationship between dying and pain. Three aspects of this transformation seem
especially striking. The first is the dissociation of pain and death, which allows
both advocates and opponents of current practices to question pain, while setting
aside the act of killing itself as a separate question, one the courts are likely to treat
with much less reproach. The second is the wish to not only minimize pain but
eliminate it. And the third is a concern not only with the experience of dying but
also with its appearance. All three aspects, as we shall see, emerged in the late
nineteenth century and continue to characterize the legal regulation of these three
deaths today.
A. Separating Pain from Death
The convergence of the three deaths cannot be explained merely as a
humane concern with the minimization of pain. For such a concern to emerge, a
prior and more radical transformation took place, not only of the ethics but also
of the ontology and aesthetics of humane killing. The most significant change was
the separation of pain from dying. The ontological possibility of a painless death
was a necessary precondition for the ethical demand for it. Furthermore, the
ethical separation of pain from death means that pain can make the taking of life
legally questionable, while killing itself is set aside as a separate question and often
goes unquestioned. Death is taken for granted, whereas dying is closely
scrutinized. To be sure, opponents of the death penalty and animal slaughter are
of the Legalization of Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide in the Netherlands and Oregon, 16 ELDER L.J.
333, 333 (2008).
87. Annette E. Clark, The Right to Die: The Broken Road from Quinlan to Schiavo, 37 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 385, 397–98 (2006).
88. The heated controversy in the Schiavo case is one of the more recent reminders. See, e.g.,
Rebecca Dresser, Schiavo and Contemporary Myths About Dying, 61 U. M IAMI L. R EV. 821 (2007).
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often concerned with a broader array of issues than minimizing pain and readily
endorse more radical alternatives, from abolitionism to vegetarianism, but these
alternatives fall outside the law’s purview. The law erects an acoustic partition
between the moans of the dying and the silence of the dead, attending to the
former, while turning a deaf ear to the latter.
Up to the nineteenth century, in all three acts of killing, death was
indistinguishable from pain and suffering, though in each case the connection
carried a different rationale. In the case of the death penalty, pain was not merely a
tolerable by-product of the taking of life but precisely what punishment (Latin,
poena) was about.89 For justice to be done, the pain and suffering of the
transgressor had to be sensed and seen.90 In natural death, giving up the ghost
gave rise almost inevitably to the pangs of death, as the soul refused to be torn
away from the body. More generally, within Christendom, the pain of dying was
conceived as either punishment for sin, a test of the perseverance of faith, or
simply another sign of the corrupted world and the mortality of Man.91 And
finally, in the case of animal slaughter, Man’s dominion over the animal gave
humans both the right to take their life and the privilege to make little of their
pain. Whether a desired outcome, a necessary by-product, or an admissible
sacrifice, the point is not simply that causing pain was justifiable, but that it was
viewed as inseparably connected to the taking of life.
By the nineteenth century, none of the above could be taken for granted any
longer. The separation of death from pain—that is, the separation of death from
the process of dying—allowed legislators and courts to concentrate on the
regulation of the pain of dying, while setting aside the fact of killing and death.
Dying became a distinct and highly questionable process, whereas death, or the
taking of life, became an entirely separate ethical question and quite often an
unquestionable legal norm.
This development is most apparent in the case of animal slaughter. Whereas
taking the life of livestock is not questioned under modern Western law, ever
more detailed attention is being devoted to the methods of slaughter in order to
assure their humaneness and the minimal affliction of pain in the process. A
similar development has taken place with respect to the death penalty. Positive law
takes for granted the constitutional legitimacy of the death penalty, but even the
most vocal advocates of the constitutionality of the death penalty do not question
the constitutional constraints on the infliction of pain.
Things are a bit more complicated in the case of the deathbed, but a close
historical analysis may reveal that here, too, a separation of death from the pain of
dying has occurred. Unlike the death penalty and animal slaughter, taking the life
of the dying patient as a public policy was hardly thinkable before the nineteenth
89. Joel Meyer, Reflections on Some Theories of Punishment, 59 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY &
POLICE SCI. 595, 595–97 (1968).
90. Id.
91. Romans 6:23.
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century. The common law deemed euthanasia murder, and assisted suicide—
assisted murder.92 Under the law, suicide was a heinous crime, a felon de se, and
English law punished not only inchoate attempts but also actual suicides.93 The
King’s Treasury confiscated the property of the deceased, and desecrated the body
by burying it at a crossroads.94 Today, however, the legitimacy of euthanasia is no
longer fundamentally questioned. The common legal debate in the United States
concerns the constitutional right to die and not a constitutional prohibition on
killing. In other words, whereas the prohibition of the taking of life is not
constitutionally protected, suffering pain at the deathbed has become a
constitutional concern.95
Indeed, while the legitimacy of euthanasia is hotly debated, what is not
debated is the right not to suffer pain even at the price of hastening death. Justice
O’Connor referred to this unchallenged legal standard:
[T]here is no need to address the question whether suffering patients
have a constitutionally cognizable interest in obtaining relief from the
suffering that they may experience in the last days of their lives. There is
no dispute that dying patients . . . can obtain palliative care, even when
doing so would hasten their death.96
B. Intolerable Pain
There is a further perplexing characteristic of the humanization of dying,
which cannot be explained simply as a wish to minimize pain. In all three deaths,
laws demand not merely that pain be reduced but rather pronounce a more radical
ban on suffering. Pain and suffering are measured in seconds and detected in the
least expected places. Often, even a minor quantum of pain may face fierce legal
objection. Low degrees of pain and suffering, which would otherwise raise hardly
any legal concern, become intolerable when experienced in the face of death. Why
is it that the taking of life magnifies even the minutest suffering?
A case in point is the Florida Constitutional Court ruling in the expected
execution of Thomas Harrison Provenzano.97 The petitioner challenged the
constitutionality of the electric chair, arguing that its use results in a prolonged
death and creates a risk of pain.98 The court heard testimony from over a dozen
state officials, who had witnessed past executions and testified on a variety of
92. Kam C. Wong, Whose Life Is It Anyway?, 5 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 223, 244
n.37 (2006).
93. Stacy L. Mojica & Dan S. Murrell, The Right to Choose—When Should Death Be in the
Individual’s Hands?, 12 WHITTIER L. R EV. 471, 472 (1991).
94. Id. at 473.
95. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
96. Id. at 737–38 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
97. Order Regarding Petitioner’s “Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Petition
to Invoke This Court’s All Writs Jurisdiction and Petition for Extra Ordinary Relief,”
Florida v. Provenzano, (Fla. 1999) (No. CR84-835), available at http://www.dc.state.fl.us/oth/
deathrow/drorder.html.
98. Id.
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issues, but focused on the mouth and chin straps that were used to secure the
inmate’s head to the electric chair.99 As expected, the court found death by
electrocution constitutional.100 Its only reservation concerned the use of the
straps, which according to the court, were at times too tightly bound and caused
unnecessary suffering.101 The court concluded that the use of a mouth strap “may
be desirable, however a smaller and/or redesigned mouth strap could accomplish
the same purpose without raising the same issue involved here.”102
A similar pattern emerges in the two other cases. In the case of animal
slaughter, animal welfare advocates claim that traditional-religious practices are
inhumane.103 Numerous studies have tried to establish the precise degree and
duration of suffering,104 and for over a century leading veterinarians have debated
whether traditional forms of slaughter prolong the death pangs.105 Tellingly, the
difference between the opposing parties is measured in seconds. Other critics of
ritual slaughter focus on the preparatory phase; with striking similarity to the death
penalty cases, they pay close attention to the strapping of the animal. The
following is a typical argument in this context: “While the old-fashioned Weinberg
pen has been documented as inducing stress levels almost 300% higher than levels
resulting from the use of an upright pen, the Facomia pen used by Agri Processors
is said to cause less stress.”106
C. Dying and the Phantom of Pain
A third and final characteristic of the ethics of the secular concerns the
relationship between the experience of pain and its appearance. Here a further
difference between the Benthamite calculus of pain and the ethics of the secular
emerges: the centrality of aesthetics to ethics. If the taking of life is to be properly
practiced, the absence of pain should be seen as much as experienced. The ethical
challenge then becomes to bridge the gap between the appearance of pain and the
alleged painlessness of death.
One possible way of bridging this gap, discussed earlier, was to introduce

99. Provenzano v. Moore, 744 So. 2d 413, 422 (Fla. 1999).
100. Id. at 414.
101. Id. at 433.
102. Id. at 413.
103. Melissa Lewis, The Regulation for Kosher Slaughter in the United States: How to Supplement
Religious Law so as to Ensure the Humane Treatment of Animals, 16 A NIMAL L. 259, 263 (2010).
104. E.g., TEMPLE GRANDIN & JOE M. REGENSTEIN, MEAT FOCUS INT’L, RELIGIOUS
SLAUGHTER AND ANIMAL WELFARE: A DISCUSSION FOR MEAT SCIENTISTS (1994), available at
http://digitool.library.colostate.edu///exlibris/dtl/d3_1/apache_media/L2V4bGlicmlzL2R0bC9kM
18xL2FwYWNoZV9tZWRpYS8xNjM0Ng==.pdf; see also SHECHITA UK, A GUIDE TO SHECHITA
11 (H. Kesselman et al. eds., 2009), available at http://www.shechitauk.org/fileadmin/user
_upload/pdf/A_Guide_to_Shechita_2009_.pdf.
105. See, e.g., J.A. DEMBO, THE JEWISH M ETHOD OF SLAUGHTER COMPARED WITH OTHER
M ETHODS: FROM THE HUMANITARIAN, HYGIENIC, AND ECONOMIC POINTS OF VIEW (London,
Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. 1894).
106. Lewis, supra note 103, at 268 (footnote omitted).
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new methods of taking life that would not only cause less suffering but would also
appear less abhorrent. A different solution was to argue that the dying only
seemed to be experiencing pain, but actually, the spectacle of the tortured body
did not correspond to any real experience of pain. What used to be an inseparable
experience of dying in pain became the separable experience of a painless death
accompanied by a seemingly horrifying but ultimately benign “phantom of pain.”
The question of apparent pain and suffering has been a recurrent theme in
cases discussing the constitutionality of the electric chair. Early on, it seemed as if
electrocution would bridge the gap between the painlessness of death and a calm
appearance of death. The point was made in the first constitutional review of the
death penalty in the late nineteenth century,
[W]e think that the evidence is clearly in favor of the conclusion that it is
within easy reach of electrical science at this day to so generate and apply
to the person of the convict a current of electricity of such known and
sufficient force as certainly to produce instantaneous, and therefore
painless, death.107
Evidence that began piling up before the courts complicated matters, showing that
the high voltage effectually burns the prisoner and is accompanied by extreme
convulsions of the body, which may indicate the experience of extraordinary
pain.108 Many states eventually adopted alternative modes of execution, but
advocates of the electric chair continued to insist that the high voltage produces
instant unconsciousness, preventing any experience of pain.109 However, a
dissenting opinion of the Supreme Court of Nebraska endorses the practice of
electrocution:
The State’s contention that electrocution does not subject prisoners to
unnecessary pain . . . the electric current would cause instantaneous and
irreversible electroporation of brain neurons or thermal heating of
neurons would reach the point of causing cell death within 4 to 5
seconds. If correct, either theory would mean instantaneous or nearinstantaneous loss of brain function and consciousness.110
The introduction of the lethal injection was supposed to solve the problem.
The choice of a three-stage rather than a two-stage method had the sole aim of
eliminating the appearance of the body in pain. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit’s decision clearly states the logic behind the procedure:
As the State explained, however, a two-drug protocol would lead to
convulsions, a phenomenon the State understandably wished to avoid out
of respect for the dignity of the individual and presumably out of respect
for anyone, including the inmate’s family, watching the execution. (Lethal
107. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 443 (1890) (quoting People ex rel. Kemmler v. Durston, 7
N.Y.S. 813, 818 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1889)).
108. Philip R. Nugent, Pulling the Plug on the Electric Chair: The Unconstitutionality of Electrocution, 2
WM. & M ARY BILL RTS. J. 185, 197 (1993).
109. Id.
110. State v. Mata, 745 N.W.2d 229, 273 (Neb. 2008).
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injection without pancuronium bromide “would typically result in
involuntary movement which might be misinterpreted as a seizure or an
indication of consciousness.”).111
Paradoxically, as we have seen, this solution gave rise to new concerns. Any
attempt to artificially suppress the appearance of the body in pain may, at least in
theory, lead to the horrifying result of a suffering which cannot be detected. The
attempt to overcome the gap between a painless reality and a horrifying spectacle
may lead to an opposite gap between a tranquil appearance and a painful
experience.
A similar argument was made in the scientific literature with respect to the
terminally ill patient. Physicians of the late nineteenth century who opposed
euthanasia claimed that dying was in fact a natural experience, common
perceptions of the deathbed notwithstanding. Though the body seemed to be in
pain, in fact there was no experience of suffering. The argument was quite simple,
even if grounding it required sophisticated scientific evidence. To make this point,
the physicians and physiologists of the time developed a new semiology of the
body, based on a hermeneutics of suspicion. An eminent physician of the late
nineteenth century wrote:
[C]onvulsions, which so often attend the process of dying, are accepted in
evidence of suffering, when in fact they are the reverse, for they imply a
loss of consciousness and sensibility, and therefore, of the capacity to feel
pain. They are automatic, and in all essential respects like the convulsions
of epilepsy, of which the subject is wholly unconscious.112
Similarly, the groaning that accompanies the convulsions—that is, the voice of the
dying patient—was also discarded as proof of pain, for the same groans
accompany “the influence of ethereal vapor.”113
While proponents of new methods of killing were using scientific and
technological advancements to prove the cruelty of old methods and to develop
new methods that would minimize the suffering of pain, supporters of the old and
traditional practices also turned to science, but to prove their humaneness.114
Advocates of ritual animal slaughter made similar arguments to protect
Jewish and Muslim slaughter. Isaac Dembo, a leading veterinarian of the
nineteenth century, launched a comparative and comprehensive study of animal
slaughter across Europe.115 His research, which was published in 1894, was highly
influential and soon translated into English. Dembo claimed that “[t]he attempt to
111. Workman v. Bredesen, 486 F.3d 896, 909 (6th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted).
112. WILLIAM MUNK, EUTHANASIA: OR M EDICAL TREATMENT IN AID OF AN E ASY
DEATH 20 (BiblioBazaar 2010) (1887).
113. W.C. Dendey, On the Physiology of Death and the Treatment of the Dying, 1 J. PSYCHOL. M ED.
& M ENTAL PATHOLOGY 112, 119 (1848).
114. Senator Hubert H. Humphrey voiced a similar position during congressional discussions
of the new slaughter bill. 104 CONG. R EC. 15,373 (1958); see also Jones v. Butz, 374 F. Supp. 1284,
1291 n.10 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
115. See DEMBO, supra note 105, at 103–11.
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prove that consciousness is retained by instancing the fact that sometimes
epileptoid convulsions follow the act of slaughter does not seem to me at all
(more) reasonable . . . to the animal that is already deeply unconscious, it matters
nothing whether its muscles are convulsed or at rest . . . .”116
And similarly, nearly a century before opponents of the death penalty
concerned themselves with the use of paralytics, turn of the twentieth-century
animal protection activists were mindful of the use of drugs, such as curare, which
may conceal the reality of animal suffering. As one physician noted, “The drug
[curare] is never used as an anesthetic except when it is necessary to anesthetize
the public conscience.”117
To conclude, one way of separating the body in pain from the dying body
was by reducing the suffering involved in death. Another solution was to deny the
reality of suffering as mere appearance, by introducing a split between the real
pain suffered by the living and the phantom of pain, which, although it may be
highly disconcerting to the surrounding people, remains unknown to the dead
corpse.
III. HUMANE K ILLING BEYOND THE
DISENCHANTMENT/ENCHANTMENT DIVIDE
The convergence of the death penalty, medical euthanasia, and animal
slaughter is a riddle that should not be resolved too hastily. Two solutions readily
offer themselves. Each, as will become clear, represents a different understanding
of the relationship between humane killing and the modern age. The first is a
theory of secularization, along Weberian lines, which emphasizes processes of
rationalization and disenchantment. The second, its mirror image, is a theory of
re-enchantment, which follows in the footsteps of Girard’s accounts of mimetic
violence and political theology. Each account illuminates certain aspects of the
phenomenon, but neither offers an exhaustive account of the whole. The tension
between the disenchantment and enchantment accounts of the dying process is
logically irreconcilable and raises the question as to what precisely is the
relationship between the two explanations and whether and how they shed light
on humane killing.
A. Secularization and Disenchantment
The first account is grounded in the Weberian thesis of secularization. This
account is most readily applicable to the deathbed of the dying patient. In fact,
Weber himself contemplated the question regarding the crisis of dying in the
modern world.118 Discussing Tolstoy’s Ivan Ilych,119 he writes: “All [Tolstoy’s]
116.
117.

Id. at 11.
Alper, supra note 16, at 822 (quoting EDWARD BERDOE, A CATECHISM OF
VIVISECTION: THE WHOLE CONTROVERSY ARGUED IN ALL ITS DETAILS 70 (1903)).
118. M AX WEBER, Science as a Vocation, in ON CHARISMA AND I NSTITUTION BUILDING 294,
297–99 (S.N. Eisenstadt ed., 1968).
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broodings increasingly revolved around the problem of whether or not death is a
meaningful phenomenon. And his answer was: for civilized man death has no
meaning.”120
Indeed, dying, once a transitional moment from this world to the world to
come, gradually became a this-worldly event.121 First, in the sixteenth century,
extreme unction, the rite of the deathbed, was replaced by the Protestant ars
moriendi that demanded self-reflection and an inner religious experience of
transformation.122 Second, in the nineteenth century, the medicalization of death
took place, along with a changing of the guard between the confessional priest and
the medical doctor.123 Dying and its associated pain and suffering lost their
meaning and could no longer constitute either a meaningful personal experience
or a communal spectacle.124 Pain was overcome by the use of anesthetics,125 and
dying was circumvented either by an attempt to prolong life indefinitely or, by the
flip side of the same coin, the deliberate desire to hasten death.
In a similar way and still within the Weberian framework, we can understand
the transformations of the death penalty, which in premodern societies had clear
religious undertones. The execution inscribed the torments of the soul on the
tormented body. The public execution, including the expectation of a public
confession, took place in the name of both the earthly and heavenly sovereign.126
Once, no later than the nineteenth century, when the death penalty was no longer
viewed as divine punishment enacted by human hands, there could be little
justification for or sense to the affliction of what became viewed as “unnecessary”
pain. Finally, the slaughter of animals, too, had its origins in a religious cosmology
in which humans were higher on the scala naturae than animals,127 which were
placed under their dominion only because this was the will of their common
Creator. The killing of animals was now justified as serving bare human needs, but
only to the extent the taking of life, which required no special justification, could
be divorced from the process of dying, which underwent close scrutiny.
The pain of dying no longer had a place in a rationalized and disenchanted
world. Pain could only be justified if it served a purpose, and hardly any purpose
could be served by the suffering of a person who will soon perish. The suffering
of the dying could not be justified as part of a process of recovery, nor could the
suffering of the death-row inmate be justified as part of a process of repentance
119.
120.
121.
122.

TOLSTOY, IVAN ILYICH, supra note 1.
WEBER, supra note 118, at 298.
See LAVI, supra note 76, at 57–61.
On the ars moriendi tradition, see DAVID WILLIAM ATKINSON, T HE ENGLISH ARS
MORIENDI, at xiii–xxv (Eckhard Bernstein ed., 1992).
123. See L AVI, supra note 76, at 44–54.
124. IVAN ILLICH, M EDICAL NEMESIS: THE E XPROPRIATION OF H EALTH 10 (1976).
125. See M ARTIN S. PERNICK, A CALCULUS OF SUFFERING: PAIN, PROFESSIONALISM, AND
A NESTHESIA IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY A MERICA 236 (1985).
126. On secularization of the death penalty, see GARLAND, supra note 7, 53–54.
127. Kyle Ash, Why “Managing” Biodiversity Will Fail: An Alternative Approach to Sustainable
Exploitation for International Law, 13 A NIMAL L. 209, 231 (2007).
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and atonement. As for retribution, death itself served this role and any additional
unnecessary suffering would be vengeful. Similarly, the taking of life of an animal
might be a human necessity, but to cause it additional pain in the process, cannot
be anything but a mark of human cruelty. As long as dying and death were closely
intertwined, pain could be understood and justified as part of a corrupted world—
a necessary outcome of the departure of the soul from the body, an atonement of
the condemned, and a privilege that humanity had over the animal kingdom—but
with the separation of death from dying, the pain of the dying became intolerable.
The pain of the dying could no longer be justified nor could it be
comprehended. This led scientists to question its very existence. Physicians,
physiologists, and veterinarians wondered whether pain in dying was a mere
appearance, a combination of a body that lost its vitality and could no longer
experience pain, but merely undergo convulsion. Dying was no longer a dramatic
moment in which the soul was torn away from the body, but merely a moment of
depletion, not a transition to a world to come, but a passage into nothingness.
Convincing and coherent as this framework of analysis may sound, it is hard
to accept the disenchantment thesis on face value. In the final analysis, it tells a
story that is hard to believe: on how we moderns have ridden ourselves from the
residues of older metaphysics and replaced it with the cold processes of
rationalization and demystification and failed to account for the exceptional nature
of these acts of killing. One is left with the suspicion that rather than an
enlightened overcoming the sacred and enchanted, the very idea of a humane
killing calls to life the all but dead specters of the sacred.
B. Enchantment and the Sacred
Disenchantment and rationalization processes offer a plausible framework
for unraveling part of the puzzle of humane killing. But some aspects of the
phenomenon remain unresolved. The meticulous concern with the suffering of
the dying seems to exceed the rational imperative to reduce unnecessary pain. This
heightened sensitivity is not easily reconcilable with what appears to be a legal
indifference to the act of killing itself. Furthermore, the insistence that dying not
only be painless, but also appear to be painless, suggests that humane killing is
carried out as a public spectacle as much as an ethical commitment, and that it
seeks to appease public emotions as much as to assuage public reason.
These exceptional elements of humane killing suggest that rather than a
secular ethics of dying, we are facing a sacred ritual of taking life. Contra Weber, it
is not that dying has been separated from death and has become an independent
focus of moral concern, but rather that a new way of taking life has developed,
one very different from its historical antecedents but by no means less meaningful
or less ritualized. Under this account, the concern with the pain of dying does not
imply that death is taken for granted, but rather that the painlessness of death is
precisely what lends this form of killing its meaning and legitimacy. Similarly, the
spectacle of a painless death and the serene body do not suggest that pain has lost
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its meaning and its enchanting power. The silence of the body—far from
muteness—speaks in its own dialect of the sacredness of the act of killing.
This alternative interpretation of humane killing takes its cue from René
Girard’s insight regarding the relationship between violence, law, and the
sacred.128 If modernity for Weber is about the demise of the sacred, for Girard the
sacred continues to govern modern societies, albeit in less conspicuous forms.129
For Girard, violent acts of taking life such as the execution of the criminal and the
slaughter of the animal are best understood as scared acts of killing, for the sacred
is nothing other than an encounter with the ultimate, which in contemporary
societies takes the form of the modern state.130
In nonmodern societies, according to Girard, these sacred acts of killing take
the form of sacrifice. What is distinct and puzzling about sacrifice is that the
violence of the law is directed against the innocent rather than the guilty. This is
apparent in ancient traditions and myths in the sacrifice of animals for divine and
human consumption and in the sacrifice of the young and innocent to appease the
gods. Girard’s explanation of the logic of sacrifice is revealing. Violence, he claims,
constantly threatens to spiral out of control leading to endless cycles of
devastation.131 Any attempt to entirely rid society from violence is bound to fail.
The challenge is to contain violence and limit its destructive effects by directing
violence outside of society and channeling it to the vulnerable and innocent parties
on the margins of society.132 The taking of life remains an encounter with “the
ultimate,” but rather than God, it is now the state that has taken the place of the
deity, containing violence by an act of sacred killing that prevents it from
spreading and thus guards a peaceful order. Similarly and following Girard, one
may view the death penalty, euthanasia, and the slaughter of the animal as sacred
acts of killing. They are socially sanctioned executions, ultimate acts of taking life
that are meant to quiet social unease, much as ancient sacrifice sought to appease
the gods.
True, the three forms of humane killing do not involve pain nor the spilling
of blood that historically lent these deaths their ritual character. Indeed, at first
there may seem to be little in common between the violent sacrifice of the
innocent and the humane killing of the animal, the death row inmate, or the dying
patient. Girard would readily concede that today the lawful taking of life no longer
has the form of sacrifice. Rather than a passionate outburst of religious violence,
today one faces the pacified mechanisms of the judicial system. It is not the
innocent who is sacrificed, but the guilty; or, as in the case of the dying patient, life

128. R ENÉ GIRARD, VIOLENCE AND THE SACRED 326 (Patrick Gregory trans., 2005). A
similar line of argument has been taken up more recently in COLIN DAYAN, L AW IS A WHITE DOG:
HOW L EGAL R ITUALS M AKE AND UNMAKE PERSONS (2011).
129. GIRARD, supra note 128, at 326.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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that does not deserve protection because it has lost its sacredness and dignity; or,
as in the case of the brute animal, which is no longer recognized as part of divine
creation, life which is denied such sacredness from the outset. But is the execution
of the utterly helpless and disrobed less sacred than the sacrifice of the innocent?
And does the absence of pain deny sacred power, or is it precisely the elimination
of pain that reveals the sacred character of humane killing?
Quite on the contrary, Gerard argues. The taking of life by the all-powerful
state, like ancient deities possessing ultimate power over life and death, is the
modern reincarnation of sacred killing. Whereas the killing of the innocent was
intended to channel violence outside of society and prevent the endless cycle of
bloodshed, with the rise of the modern state and the monopoly of the judicial
system over the legitimate use of violence, this threat no longer exists. The state
can put an end to the cycle of violence precisely because it can kill without
shedding blood. What distinguishes the death penalty from the scaffold, medical
euthanasia from suicide, and the stunning of the animal in the modern abattoir
from the traditional neck-cut is the pacified taking of life. As opposed to the
criminal whose violence is always limited and is likely to meet the resistance of
both the victim and the state, the state’s killing manifests the sovereign’s
monopoly over violence, which meets no resistance. Consequently, whereas the
scene of the crime is often a site of struggle, pain and the violent shedding of
blood, state-sanctioned execution is pacified, bloodless, and painless. This is
equally true with the necessary adjustments to the pacified and sterilized death of
euthanasia and modern slaughter. The innocent victim of sacrifice has been
replaced by the helpless victim of humane killing, whose silent killing announces
the almighty power of the state.
One may find a further elaboration of a similar point in Giorgio Agamben’s
account of sacred killing.133 Agamben’s point of departure is the homo sacer, a
marginal figure of Roman law, whose legal status is defined by the perplexing
statement that he “may be killed and yet not sacrificed.”134 Agamben offers an
elaborate interpretation of the homo sacer as a person whose existence has been
reduced to bare life, namely, to mere biological existence.135 In contradistinction
to Girard, the power of the sovereign is not the monopoly over the use of
legitimate violence, but rather the power to exclude a person from the protection
of the law and declare him a homo sacer.136 The sovereign power to ban is the
power to disrobe life from its sacredness and to condemn life to mere biological
existence, to a life that may be extinguished without sanction.
The accuracy of Agamben’s historical account of Roman law has been

133. GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER AND BARE L IFE (Daniel
Heller-Roazen trans., 1995).
134. Id. at 8.
135. Id. at 3–4.
136. Id. at 5–6.
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challenged and need not be resolved here.137 More important and more relevant to
our discussion are the contemporary examples that Agamben discusses as modern
incarnations of the homo sacer. He refers in this context to the dying patient and to
the animal, but his insights may equally pertain to death-row inmates. All three
figures are excluded by law from the law and are denied legal protection. Humane
killing from this perspective is the lawful killing of the outlawed. If, as a rule, law is
what grants biological life sacred protection, in these exceptional cases law deems
life to mere biological existence. These figures are banned to “a zone of
indistinction” in which legal normativity is no longer distinguishable from mere
biological facticity. Life is only protected as the bare life of a sentient being, and
consequently, it is protected from pain and suffering but not from killing itself.
The sovereign exercises in these acts of killing his ultimate power to reduce life to
its mere biological existence. Humane killing under this account is not the least
violent way of killing, but rather the killing that takes a very particular form of
violence—a spectacle of painless violence. If indeed, as Girard and Agamben
suggest, death purified from pain and blood is the modern insignia of sacred
killing, then the modern world is much less disenchanted than Weber would have
us think. In these practices, the sacred continues to thrive as a specter lurking
behind what only appears to be a disenchanted death.
C. Toward an Anthropology of the Secular
We have explored two seemingly contradictory accounts of humane killing,
one placing the practice in the grand narrative of rationalization and
disenchantment, and the other in the grand narrative of ritualization and reenchantment. Are we called to choose between the two? Do the two exhaust the
landscape of possible explanations, or should we seek alternative accounts? In
this final section, I claim that the two frameworks share more in common than
may seem, and that a proper understanding of their interrelationship opens an
alternative path for understanding humane killing, which does not commit itself to
the grand narratives of modernity.
This alternative offers a critical appraisal of the secularization thesis without
falling prey to its diametric opposite, to the enchantment of the world, which
assumes the same set of binary oppositions between enchantment and
disenchantment only to side with the former rather than with the latter.
Rephrasing Talal Asad’s line of inquiry, the challenge before us is to accept
the reality of the secular without accepting the secularist account of this reality.
Secularism is here understood as the ideological, self-congratulatory account of the
secular, which portrays secularization as a unified process and as an inevitable
outcome of modernity, whereas the secular is an important but much less

137. See, e.g., Puspa Damai, The Killing Machine of Exception: Sovereignty, Law, and Play in
Agamben’s State of Exception, 5 NEW CENTENNIAL R EV. 255, 255–76 (2005) (reviewing GIORGIO
AGAMBEN, STATE OF E XCEPTION (Kevin Attell trans., 2005)).
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comprehensive phenomenon, and thus markedly different from its Weberian and
the Girardian account. Asad explains,
The secular, I argue, is neither continuous with the religious that
supposedly preceded it (that is, it is not the latest phase of a sacred origin)
nor a simple break from it (that is, not the opposite, an essence that
excludes the sacred). I take the secular to be a concept that brings
together certain behaviors, knowledges, and sensibilities in modern
life . . . . It is a matter of showing how contingencies relate to changes in
the grammar of concepts—that is, how the changes in concepts articulate
changes in practices.138
Asad emphasizes the contingency of the secular. The secular does not
produce a systematic, logically coherent pattern of practices. The proper study of
the secular is as an anthropology, not as a philosophy. In our context, it would be
a mistake to reduce humane killing to a “logic” of the secular, but it would be
equally wrong to dub humane killing as “sacred” only because attempts at a
systematic rationalization of the secular have failed.
Furthermore, Asad’s critique of secularism emphasizes the morally laden and
ethically questionable presuppositions of secularization. This is an important
insight, which brings us back to our initial point of departure. What first caught
our attention about the convergence of the three deaths was not the metaphysics
of disenchantment and enchantment, but rather, and most directly, the emergence
of a new ethics—the ethics of “humane” killing. Thus, the place to resume our
critical account is in a proper understanding of this highly peculiar practice of
“humanization.”
From the viewpoint of secularist ideology, the “humanization of death” is a
mark of ethical progress, one commonly identified with Norbert Elias’s famous
civilizing process.139 According to Elias, in a long and gradual historical
progression, Europeans became ever more self-restrained in their approach to
violence, sexual behavior, and bodily functions, and learned to sublimate strong
drives and emotional impulses.140 The civilizing process, which began in the
medieval courts among the aristocratic elite, gradually trickled down and spread
among the middle and lower classes.141
Elias himself demonstrated the implications of this thesis for the history of
death and dying in his book The Loneliness of Dying. He writes:
Death is one of the great bio-social dangers in human life. Like other
animal aspects, death, both as a process and as memory-image, is pushed
more and more behind the scenes of social life during this civilizing
spurt . . . . Never before in the history of humanity have the dying been

138.
139.

ASAD, supra note 10, at 79.
NOBERT ELIAS, THE CIVILIZING PROCESS: SOCIOGENETIC AND PSYCHOGENETIC
INVESTIGATIONS (Eric Dunning et al. eds., Edmund Jephcott trans., rev. ed. 2000).
140. Id. at 117–19.
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removed so hygienically behind the scenes of social life; never before
have human corpses been expedited so odourlessly and with such
technical perfection from the deathbed to the grave.142
For Elias, the humanization of death ties the ethical imperative together with
sociopsychological sensitivities. It is a part of modern Western societies’ attempt
to eliminate the visceral dimension of dying and the violence of death—be it the
death of humans or animals, the dying or the executed.143
A critique of the secularist account of morality begins by noting that the
three cases of humane killing are by no means part of an all-encompassing grand
narrative of Western secular ethics. Quite on the contrary, the practices of humane
killing are highly circumscribed and narrowly defined. They are the exception and
not the rule, as is evident once they are set against the background of broader
institutional practices. Incarceration facilities, the hospital, and the slaughterhouse
have become synonymous not with the reduction of pain and suffering, but rather
as sites of their unnecessary infliction. These total institutions inhabit dire
conditions of existence that dramatically diverge from the humane standards of
taking life. Placing humane killing within its institutional context reveals an
apparent tension between the resolution to overcome pain and suffering, which
exists side-by-side with inhumane conditions that remain unchallenged and are
often taken for granted.
This is not to deny a growing awareness to the living conditions behind the
walls of these institutions, nor to ignore activist mobilization aimed at improving
these conditions through legal means, including animal welfare laws, prisoner
rights, and patient rights. But the very existence of these struggles suggests that in
the final analysis these mundane forms of pain and suffering are tolerated and
treated dramatically differently from the intolerable pain and suffering involved in
humane killing. This disparity is highlighted when we view the nineteenth-century
reforms, discussed above, from the vantage point of the twenty-first century.
From the perspective of the present, the rise of humane killing in the late
nineteenth century can no longer be seen, if ever it could, as a forward march
toward a greater humanization of the treatment of the dying, the inmate, or the
prisoner.
And yet, this disparity should not bring us back to charges of hypocrisy.
Hypocrisy is a form of condemnation, not an explanation. Furthermore, charges
of hypocrisy are grounded on the assumption that one may expect consistency in
ethics, as if ethics was a logical system of propositions. But there is something
quite different from hypocrisy that is taking place in human killing and a deeper
understanding of Elias’s contribution may help us see this.
142. NOBERT ELIAS, THE LONELINESS OF DYING 12, 23 (Edmung Jephcott trans., 1985).
143. A similar idea is echoed in Chief Justice Warren’s famous assertion that the Eighth
Amendment prohibition of “cruel and unusual punishment” should draw its meaning from “evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,
100–01 (1958).
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Elias’s thesis has been read—and rightfully so—as yet another version of the
secularization thesis, unfolding the march of humanity away from irrational
emotions and toward the rational ordering of Western civilization.144 But this is
not the only possible interpretation of the civilizing process nor the most revealing
one. This becomes evident once Elias’s account is read as a history of etiquette
rather than of ethics. Elias seems to say as much when he emphasizes that his
interest lies not in the moral and ethical formation of individuals (akin to the
German notion of Bildung) but rather in the outward change of attitudes and
behaviors (captured by the French civilisation).145 Carrying this line of thought one
step further, and most likely beyond Elias’s original intentions, the process he
identified does not have an overall and indiscriminate scope and does not
characterize Western modernity as such. Rather, he documents the emergence of
certain patterns of sensitivity to suffering that give rise to a context-specific
etiquette.
This may explain why it makes sense to discuss in one and the same breath,
as part of one and the same civilizing process, the benign development of table
manners along the much weightier process of the humanization of taking life.
From an ethical point of view, placing these practices on the same axis may seem
as a banalization of ethics, but once we begin thinking of these evolving traditions
as etiquette rather than ethics, there is no room to be puzzled about the
contingency of these patterns and their discrepancies.
Humane killing is a distinct modern etiquette, which applies only in specific
contexts and is driven less by the logic of moral principles and more by the
contingency of ethical sensibilities. It is a ritual not in any enchanted sense, but
rather as an elaborate manual of practices of the body and on the body that have
been singled out. What may explain humane killing, according to Asad, is not a
study of secularism as a comprehensive philosophy, but as a contingent
anthropology.146
But Asad’s endorsement of contingency should not be taken to an extreme.
Doing so might leave us at the end precisely where we had begun, baffled by the
practices of humane killing. By way of conclusion we must consider the possibility
that our long journey may have not been in vain after all, and that even if in the
final analysis, neither disenchantment nor enchantment can be taken at face value,
each holds a part of the truth.
Humane killing is neither a result of secularization process nor the result of
enchantment. It is rather a practice that has been caught in between the old and
the new. On the one hand, the old traditions of taking life have lost any sense of
meaning to us moderns, and in that sense they do indeed belong to the secular.
On the other hand, they are unique sites of secular etiquette and do not point to a
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higher morality any more than our table manners do. The reason why these
practices receive such close scrutiny is not because they continue to be sacred
rituals, but rather precisely because they have been sacred rituals and no longer
are. In this sense they have become a mirror against which we moderns are busy
examining ourselves, insisting on carefully fashioning our appearances and
measuring ourselves against them. Doing so does not turn us into hypocrites, nor
does it suggest that we are less morally committed than our predecessors, but nor
does it make us morally more noble.
CONCLUSION
The articles collected in this Volume and in the one preceding it under the
title “Law As . . .” have been summoned by a call to rethink law beyond the
methodological and theoretical horizons of existing “Law and . . .” analysis, that is
beyond the realism, historicism, and instrumentalism that have characterized
major trends in twentieth-century American legal scholarship. Previous
conceptions of “Law and . . .” have sought to expose the social, historical, and
economic forces that coconstitute law and by this to disenchant law and
“secularize” it. In contradistinction, “Law as . . .” opens the possibility for
reexamining law beyond the secular, or—as suggested here—without taking the
“secular” at face value.
The present contribution continues a move I began exploring in the previous
volume of “Law As . . .” challenging the notion of the secular without retreating
back into the world of the sacred. The crux of the argument is that secularism—
the official ideology of the secular age—misconstrues both the secular and the
religious by presenting the secular as the counterimage of religion, thus creating a
false opposition between a modern disenchantment world and a traditional
enchanted one. A critique of secularism begins with the understanding that both
disenchantment and enchantment are modern concepts and the very juxtaposition
of the two is a hallmark of the secular age. To be sure, the problem with
contrasting religion and the secular is not the stereotypical and all too familiar
representations of the secular as ever more humane and rational system of beliefs
and practices than religion. This is merely the outcome of a much deeper
confusion about the limitations of secularism. The problem lies deeper and
emerges in much less expected contexts such as the understanding of action,
subjectivity, pain, the animal, and ritual, which provide the building blocks of the
secular world.
To critically revisit this familiar contraposition each of the two sides of the
equation needs to be studied separately on its own terms. In the previous Essay,
“Enchanting a Disenchanted Law: On Jewish Ritual and Secular History in
Nineteenth-Century Germany,”147 I explored one side of the story—namely, the
147. Shai J. Lavi, Enchanting a Disenchanted Law: On Jewish Ritual and Secular History in NineteenthCentury Germany, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. R EV. 813 (2011).
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way “religion” emerges in the nineteenth century as a category in which religious
practice is identified as “ritual,” a category which developed during the
Reformation and took on a new anthropological sense in the nineteenth century.
In the present Essay I have turned the critical gaze to the secular side of the
equation in an attempt to understand a specific syntax of secular humanism. The
way to study the secular without falling into the secularist religion/secular
juxtaposition has been to turn the critical gaze away from cases in which religion
and the secular prefigure explicitly to the study of humane ethics, in which the
secular does not lay bare on the surface.

